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1The Reception of the ECHR 
in National Legal Orders
Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller
The European Convention on Human Rights1 is the most effective human rights 
regime in the world. The Convention (ECHR), which entered into force in 1953, 
established a basic catalogue of rights binding on the signatories, and new insti-
tutions charged with monitoring and enforcing compliance. Distinctive at its 
conception, the ECHR has since evolved into an intricate legal system. The High 
Contracting Parties have steadily upgraded the regime’s scope and capacities, in 
successive treaty revisions. They have added new rights, enhanced the powers 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and strengthened the links 
between individual applicants and the regime. For its part, the Strasbourg Court 
has built a sophisticated jurisprudence, whose progressive tenor and expansive 
reach has helped to propel the system forward. Today, the Court is an important, 
autonomous source of authority on the nature and content of fundamental rights 
in Europe. In addition to providing justice in individual cases, it works to iden-
tify and to consolidate universal standards of rights protection, in the face of wide 
national diversity and a steady stream of seemingly intractable problems.
This book focuses on the impact of the Court and the Convention on the 
domestic legal systems of the regime’s members, a topic that has been understud-
ied, given its increasing importance. Two previously published pieces of research 
inspired and guided this project. The book entitled “The European Court and the 
National Courts: Legal Change in its Social, Political, and Economic Context”,2 
published in 1998, presented a series of single-country reports and comparative 
analyses of how the national courts reacted to, and ultimately, accommodated the 
European Court of Justice’s doctrine of the supremacy of European Community 
law. One premise of that earlier volume, which we share, is that national judges 
are important actors in their own right in the process through which European 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222, signed on 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention has 
now been ratified by 47 countries (31 December 2007).
2 Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (1998).
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law becomes effective in national legal orders. This volume’s scope is somewhat 
wider, in that the reports examine the role of all national officials, not only judges, 
in facilitating or resisting the influence of the Convention. The basic template for 
the research was established by Helen Keller’s pilot study entitled “Reception of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms in Poland and Switzerland”,3 an agenda we extended for this project.4
A first point of departure was the view that the Court is today institution-
ally well-positioned to exercise such influence. The Court has final jurisdiction 
over disputes concerning the content of the Convention, the compliance with 
the Convention of the High Contracting Parties, and the scope of its own ju-
risdiction (Kompetenz-Kompetenz); it has a burgeoning caseload in the form of 
individual applications; and it has produced a case law that defines what States 
owe to their own citizens under the Convention. A second point of departure was 
the observation that the regime’s influence on national officials and their deci-
sion making varies widely across States and across time. Indeed, as our research 
shows, the Court’s impact has been broad and pervasive in some States, and weak 
in others. Moreover, in those States that have been heavily influenced by the 
Convention, impact has been registered through quite different processes. How 
national officials use Convention norms, and the extent to which they resist or 
adapt to the Court’s case law, has also changed across time, sometimes radically. 
Our major objective, then, was to describe and analyse this variance, as systemati-
cally as possible, and to take some initial steps toward explaining it.
This volume reports our results. Each of the nine substantive chapters exam-
ines comparatively what we will call “the reception of the ECHR” in two States. 
By reception, we mean how – that is, through what mechanisms – national of-
ficials confront, make use of, and resist or give agency to Convention rights.5 
The book is fundamentally a work of comparative law, albeit with a twist. The 
project focuses empirical attention on the capacity of an international regime, 
and its transnational court, to shape law and politics at the domestic level. It thus 
addresses some of the same basic questions asked by students of the Europeaniza-
tion of law and politics, of multi-level governance, and of the constitutionaliza-
tion of treaty-based legal systems. The project also has a normative dimension, 
namely, to identify how the effectiveness of Convention rights in national legal 
orders has been, and can be, enhanced over time. We chart how the status of the 
Convention in domestic law and politics has changed over time, and examine, 
from a comparative perspective, the regime’s overall effectiveness.
3 Keller (2005). 
4 See infra Section B.1.
5 For an extensive discussion of reception, see infra Section B.1.
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A. The Convention and its Court
1. Origins and Evolution
In 1950, the new Council of Europe6 completed its first major venture: the draft-
ing of the ECHR. The Convention was negotiated in the immediate aftermath 
of a cataclysmic war, against the background of economic, social, and politi-
cal reconstruction, the results of which were then far from certain. This context 
heavily conditioned the “original intent”7 of the fourteen States that would sign 
the Treaty, understood as the aims and purposes that the Council of Europe ex-
pected the ECHR to serve. Most important, States considered the Convention to 
be one instrument, among others, to prevent future European wars, bolster lib-
eral democracy, oppose Communism, and express a common European identity, 
through their joint commitment to rights.
From today’s vantage point, it is obvious that the underlying nature and pur-
poses of the Convention system have changed. The broader environment in which 
the regime is embedded has undergone deep systemic transformation. In the 50’s 
and 70’s, West European States successively embraced a new constitutionalism,8 
entrenching constitutional rights and their protection; NATO and the EU suc-
ceeded in providing security and market and political integration; the EU was 
gradually constitutionalised, through the consolidation, in national legal systems, 
of the European Court of Justice’s doctrines of direct effect and supremacy; the 
Cold War ended and the Soviet bloc disintegrated. In the post-1990 period, the 
territorial scope of European commitments to rights-based constitutionalism, to 
the EU and NATO, and to the Convention further widened and deepened. Since 
1990, membership in the ECHR has increased by 24 States, covering a territory 
of roughly 450 million people. Today, the Convention’s territorial scope is truly 
pan-European, covering 47 States and more than 800 million people.
Over this same period, the ECHR experienced its own “evolutionary, some-
times revolutionary changes”.9 To take the most telling example, the founding 
signatories of the Convention were deeply divided on the question of establish-
ing an autonomous legal system with supranational authority to monitor and 
enforce compliance. In 1950, they agreed to disagree. After voting seven to four 
against creating a Court with compulsory jurisdiction, they made acceptance of 
the Court’s authority voluntary, through an optional Protocol. When objections 
were levied against proposals to allow individual applications, States made the 
individual petition optional as well. Additionally, they placed an administrative 
6 The Council of Europe was established by the Treaty of London, which was signed on 5 May 
1949 by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. For an overview of the Council of Europe and a survey of its main func-
tions, see Winkler (2006).
7 See Nichol (2005); Moravcsik (2000); Simpson (2001).
8 Shapiro and Stone Sweet (1994); Stone Sweet (2000). 
9 Shelton (2003), 100.
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body, the European Commission of Human Rights (which began operation in 
1954), between applicants and the Court (which began operating only in 1959). 
Until it was abolished in 1998, it was the Commission’s task to process applica-
tions, whether interstate or individual. Petitions reached the Court only after 
the Commission had completed its work, and only under certain conditions. 
Today, the High Contracting Parties are “locked-in”10 to a transnational system of 
rights protection that is managed and supervised by a supranational Court. State 
acceptance of the individual application and the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court is mandatory. 
The High Contracting Parties have been complicit in the expansion of the 
legal system’s autonomy and supranational character. The process has not taken 
place without the knowledge and consent of the Parties, or against their will. On 
the contrary, the ECHR and its Court have had remarkable success in socialising 
the regime’s members into the logics of collective, transnational rights protection, 
and in enlisting participation in the Convention’s expansionary dynamics.
These dynamics are easily observed. Although the ECHR was originally con-
sidered to have established minimum, and largely minimal, standards for basic 
human rights, the Strasbourg Court has interpreted Convention rights in a pro-
gressive manner. According to the Court, the ECHR is not static but a living 
instrument,11 and its contents must be read to secure effective rights protection 
for individuals, as European society evolves.12 Alongside this teleology of purpose 
and effectiveness, the Court has developed an overarching comparative meth-
odology, one result of which is to ensure a creative lawmaking role for itself. In 
defining the content and scope of Convention rights, for example, the Court 
will typically survey the state of law and practice in the States, and sometimes 
beyond. Where it finds an emerging consensus on a new, higher standard of 
rights protection among States, it may move to consolidate this consensus, as a 
point of Convention law binding upon all members.
Formally, the Court’s role is restricted to determining whether a State has in-
fringed upon Convention rights in any specific case. The Court regularly invokes 
the principle of subsidiarity and its doctrinal corollary, the margin of apprecia-
tion (the discretion to define the scope of Convention rights in the first instance) 
afforded national authorities. And it regularly reminds States that it does not 
possess the de jure power to revise the Convention on its own. Increasingly, how-
ever, the Court appears to consider that an important oracular, rights-creating, 
function inheres in its jurisdiction. Today, the Court is the unrivalled master of 
10 Ibid., 101.
11 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 5856/72), Judgement (Chamber), 25 April 1978, Series 
A, Vol. 36, para. 31; Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary objections) (appl. no. 15318/89), Judgement 
(Grand Chamber), 23 March 1995, Series A, Vol. 310, para. 71.
12 The Court requires national authorities to interpret Convention rights so as to make them 
effective for individuals, in fact. See Soering v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 14038/88), Judgement 
(Plenary), 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol. 161. 
 Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller 7
the Convention, a posture it uses to construct European fundamental rights in a 
prospective and progressive way.
Although the Court routinely identifies and develops what appear to be, from 
the perspective of at least some States, new rights and remedies, States have not 
mounted a campaign to roll back their commitments, or to curb the Court. On 
the contrary, they have added new rights to the Convention catalogue, using 
a series of optional protocols (each of which has gained adherents over time). 
States have also introduced major organizational and procedural changes, the 
most important of which came through Protocol no. 11. That Protocol, which 
entered into force in 1998, abolished the Commission of Human Rights, and 
centralised administrative authority to process claims in a new Court and its 
staff, the Registry. Under Protocol no. 11, individuals may petition the Court 
after exhausting domestic remedies. Within national legal orders, most States 
have clarified and enhanced the nature and status of the Convention through the 
incorporation of the Convention into domestic law. In most cases, incorporation 
means that individuals may plead Convention rights before national judges, who 
can directly enforce them.
As a result of these and other developments, scholars and judges now engage 
a lively debate about the regime’s constitutionalization, and its possible constitu-
tional futures.13 In Greer’s view, for example, the Court “is already ‘the Consti-
tutional Court for Europe’, in the sense that it is the final authoritative judicial 
tribunal in the only pan-European constitutional system there is”.14 This debate 
is an important indicator of the regime’s transformation. It is undeniable that, in 
the 21st century, the Convention and the Court perform functions that are com-
parable to those performed by national constitutions and national constitutional 
courts in Europe, a point to which we will return15. Further, the Court itself has 
come to see its role in constitutional terms. In a 1995 decision, the Court called 
the ECHR “a constitutional document” of European public law.16 And, in 2000, 
the President of the Court, Luzius Wildhaber, writing in a personal capacity but 
echoing prevailing sentiments on the Court, argued strongly in favour of enhanc-
ing its constitutional role and authority.17
We take no position here on how best to characterize the nature of the re-
gime. For our purposes, the constitutionalization debate is of interest in that it 
focuses attention on the structural relationship, as it has evolved, between the 
Convention and national legal orders.18 Structural questions once dismissed as 
13 Alkema (2000); Flauss (1999). See also Greer (2006), discussing the constitutionalisation of 
the ECHR and the constitutional justice dispensed by the European Court of Human Rights.
14 Greer (2006), 173.
15 See infra Section B.2.
16 Loizidou v. Turkey (supra note 11), para. 75. 
17 Wildhaber (2000). 
18 The debate is also data, indicating that something important is happening. At the very least, 
how these debates are settled will determine how the regime evolves in the future.
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largely academic are now being urgently debated by judges and politicians. Is the 
primary role of the Convention system to provide individual or constitutional 
justice? To what extent does, or should, the Court’s rights jurisprudence bind na-
tional judges, including those sitting on supreme or constitutional courts? What 
erga omnes status, if any, should important rulings of the Court be given? Can 
the principle of subsidiarity be reconciled with the Court’s preferred interpretive 
strategy, that of a forward-looking, living instrument approach?19 In the context 
of enlargement, can the Court maintain consistent standards of rights protection, 
or is the emergence of a two-track Europe inevitable? The contributions to this 
volume respond in various ways to these and other questions, from the perspec-
tive of national legal systems.
2. Determinants of Impact
We designed this project on the presumption that the Court is well positioned to 
exert influence on national legal systems, a presumption that deserves a defence. 
Other things equal, no judicial body anywhere will accrete influence over its 
broader legal and political environment in the absence of three conditions: (1) 
the institutional competence to determine the law in an authoritative manner; 
(2) a regular caseload; and (3) a minimally robust conception of precedent. In the 
ECHR context, too, these three factors are necessary conditions for strengthen-
ing, over time, the Convention’s effectiveness in national legal orders. They are 
not sufficient conditions, since the Court cannot, on its own, give agency to its 
jurisprudence in domestic legal orders. National officials – legislators, executives, 
and judges – have made choices about how to respond to the evolution of Con-
vention norms. For the Convention to make a difference domestically, officials 
must take decisions that will strengthen its effectiveness. We will turn now to 
each of these conditions.
a. Jurisdiction
Since the entry into force of Protocol no. 11, at least, the Court has possessed 
all of the formal power required for it to acquire and exert dominance over the 
evolution of the Convention system. Indeed, the jurisdictional basis of its power 
compares favourably to that of the European Court of Justice, and exceeds that 
of most national constitutional courts.20
As presently constituted, the ECHR is characterized by structural judicial su-
premacy. Consider the situation in light of contemporary delegation theory. In 
the jargon of that theory, “principals”, those in power at the ex ante constitutive 
19 Nichol (2005). Nichol argues for the more expansive, evolutionary approach and against 
minimalism, while showing that the debate between minimalists and activists (those who desire a 
progressive construction or rights), has gone unabated since 1950.
20 In comparison to rights under the ECHR, it is usually easier for a national constitution to be 
revised by those seeking to overturn a constitutional court decision, although there are exceptions to 
this rule (as when rights provisions are made immune from revision).
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moment, delegate power to “agents”, in order to help them manage their respon-
sibilities, ex post. A “trusteeship” situation is created when the principals (in this 
case, the High Contracting Parties) transfer significant “political property rights” 
to a new organ, the trustee (in this case, the Court), in order to help them govern 
themselves collectively.21 A trustee, then, possesses legal authority to govern the 
principals in light of priorities – legal commitments – to which the latter has 
agreed. By definition, a trustee court possesses final authority to determine the 
scope and content of the law, and the principals have reduced means of overrul-
ing judicial determinations that they may find objectionable. A paradigmatic 
example of such a trustee, the Strasbourg Court exercises extensive “fiduciary” 
authority over the Convention. Under Article 46 ECHR, the High Contract-
ing Parties, acting collectively as the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, “supervise [the] execution” of the Court’s final judgements.22 In this ac-
count, structural judicial supremacy is legitimized by the fact that States designed 
the system for their own express purposes, and they help to make it effective on 
a continuous basis.
The core of the Convention is a catalogue of rights, as supplemented by the 
various optional protocols.23 Under Article 1 ECHR, the High Contracting Par-
21 For a discussion of judicial trusteeship, see Stone Sweet (2002), building on the contributions 
of Majone (2001) and Moe (1990).
22 For an overview of the Council of Europe’s system of supervision and enforcement of the 
Court’s judgements, see Polakiewicz (2001).
23 Articles 2–14 comprise the substantive core of the Convention, beginning with the right to 
life (Article 2), the right to be free from torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 
3), and the right not to be held in slavery or servitude (Article 4). Basic procedural guarantees are 
established in the form of rights to personal liberty and security (Article 5), a fair trial (Article 6), 
and no punishment without law (Article 7). Articles 8–12 provide for: the right to respect of one’s 
privacy and family life, and to marry; and the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expres-
sion, assembly, and association. Article 13 states that “everyone whose [Convention] rights and 
freedoms are violated shall have an effective remedy”; and Article 14 proclaims that “the enjoyment” 
of Convention rights “shall be secured without discrimination on any ground”, including race, sex, 
language, social origin, and religion, among other categories. Optional protocols have added: rights 
to property, education, and free elections (Protocol no. 1); freedom of movement and the rights 
of nationals not to be expelled from their own State, and of aliens not to be expelled collectively 
(Protocol no. 4). Protocol no. 6 abolishes the death penalty except in times of war, and Protocol 
no. 13 outlaws the death penalty in all circumstances. Protocol no. 7 enhances certain due proc-
ess requirements, including rights to appeal and compensation for wrongful punishment. Finally, 
Protocol no. 12 (2002) establishes a general prohibition on discrimination “by any public authority 
on any ground”, while permitting affirmative action policies. With the exception of provisions on 
torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment (Article 3), and on slavery and servitude (Article 4), 
which may be considered absolute, other rights are explicitly “qualified” in various ways. Articles 
8–11, for example, are qualified by a necessity clause. States may only “interfere” with the exercise of 
these rights when “necessary in a democratic society” and “in the interests of” some specified public 
interest. States purposes mentioned include “national security”, “public safety”, “the economic well-
being of the country,” “the prevention of disorder or crime”, “the protection of health or morals”, 
and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Even in times of war and other public 
emergency, States may not derogate from Articles 2, 3, 4(1) and 7 ECHR (e contrario Article 15(2) 
ECHR). Under Article 18, states may not impose restrictions on rights “for any purpose other than 
those for which [restrictions] have been prescribed”.
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ties are legally required “to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms” this catalogue contains. The Court’s duty is to ensure that States 
meet this obligation, and its authority to do so is largely insulated from the latter’s 
control. Article 32 ECHR grants the Court exclusive, final jurisdiction over “all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”, and 
gives the Court the competence to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction. 
Under Article 46 ECHR, the Parties “undertake to abide by the final judgement 
of the Court in any case to which they are parties”. The High Contracting Parties, 
as principals, could overturn an objectionable interpretation of the Court, but 
only by revising Convention norms. In practice, the prospect is a virtual impos-
sibility, given the decision-rule governing the regime’s revision: unanimity of all 
of its members.
In addition to direct grants of authority, States can be said to have indirectly 
conferred additional powers on the Court, as the system has evolved. Convention 
norms, like modern rights provisions generally, are relatively open-ended and 
incomplete. Few rights are expressed in absolute terms; most rights are qualified 
in terms of public interest goals that States may legitimately pursue. As research 
on the travaux préparatoires shows,24 the founding States were never able to settle 
differences concerning the nature and content of the rights they enshrined. They 
disagreed, for example, about whether the Convention expressed minimum com-
mon denominator conceptions of basic rights and nothing more, or established 
a legal foundation for a more expansive evolution of rights. This disagreement 
necessarily conditioned attitudes toward establishing a court. In 1950, the found-
ing States were not prepared to establish a judicial mechanism for settling these 
disagreements. It is difficult to imagine the Convention today without its Court, 
but only because States have chosen, over time, to strengthen their commitment 
to adjudication. In doing so, States have transferred authority to complete or 
construct Convention rights, rendering them more determinate over time for all 
members, despite national diversity.25
Given structural judicial supremacy, it is not surprising that the Court domi-
nates the process through which Convention rights are given concrete expression. 
Inspired by German constitutional doctrine, for example, the Court embraced 
proportionality as a basic balancing approach to rights adjudication. Proportion-
ality is an analytical framework that is particularly well suited to managing the 
24 See Nichol (2005).
25 As with most constitutions and treaty-based regimes, the ECHR can be analyzed as an “in-
complete contract”. And, like any complex instruments of governance designed to last indefinitely, 
if not forever, the Convention is a “relational contract”. Rights provisions are expressed in general 
terms. Generalities and vagueness may facilitate agreement at the bargaining stage. But vagueness, 
by definition, is legal uncertainty, and legal uncertainty threatens to undermine the reason for con-
tracting in the first place. The establishment of the Court can be seen as an institutional response 
to the incomplete contract, that is, to the problems of uncertainty and enforcement. Adjudication 
then functions to clarify the meaning of the constitution over time, and to adapt it to changing 
circumstances. Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 127–33.
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litigation of qualified rights. Through it, the Court resolves conflicts between a 
pleaded right, on the one hand, and the public interests that may justify its limi-
tation, by public authority, on the other. Despite its advantages, proportionality 
review is one of the most intrusive forms of judicial supervision known: it requires 
courts to stand in judgement of the policy choices of State officials. In the “neces-
sity” stage of the analysis, courts deploy a “least-restrictive means” test, censuring 
government if its preferred policies infringe more on a right than is necessary to 
achieve an otherwise legitimate public purpose. For many rights, including those 
enumerated in Articles 8–11 and 14 of the Convention, individuals today possess 
a right to proportionality analysis under the “effective remedy” requirement of 
Article 13. This development is momentous, considering that proportionality 
analysis was native only to the legal systems of Germany and Switzerland.26 It has 
diffused, through Europeanization, under the tutelage of the Court.
There are important signs that the nature of the Court’s jurisdiction is cur-
rently undergoing an important expansion. As formally constituted, the ECHR 
is geared toward the rendering of individual justice. The Court is activated by 
applications from individuals, and its decisions have, technically, only inter partes 
effects (Article 46 ECHR). Further, if the Court finds a State to be in violation of 
a Convention right, it may, under Article 41, award damages to the injured party. 
With enlargement and the advent of Protocol no. 11, the system has become 
flooded with dozens, often hundreds, of virtually identical complaints generated 
by a systemic defect in a national legal order. In this situation, how to control 
the docket, and how to mete out justice, are problems that necessarily overlap. In 
2004, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited the Court, in 
the ordinary course of its work, to identify the source of systemic failure, to sug-
gest systemic solutions to the problems identified, and to recommend appropri-
ate remedies for the class of individuals who have been injured by such failures.27 
In response, the Court has begun issuing what it calls pilot judgements,28 whose 
underlying purpose is to make Convention rights effective for victims of systemic 
dysfunction, in effect, as a class of plaintiffs. When it does so, it acts manageri-
ally, proposing law of a general and prospective quality for a State whose existing 
arrangements are defective.
26 In the 80s, Turkish courts also used an approach akin to proportionality when it adjudicated 
certain fundamental rights, although it did not do so consistently. See in this volume Kaboğlu and 
Koutnatzis, Section F.2.b.
27 The Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Resolution (Res(2004)3) on Judgements 
Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem, 12 May 2004. The Council of Europe, Committee of 
Ministers, Resolution (Res(2004)6) on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies, 12 May 2004.
28 E.g., Broniowski v. Poland (appl. no. 31443/96), Judgement (Grand Chamber), 22 June 2004, 
Reports 2004-V, 1. See Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, this volume, Section G.1.
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b. Activity 
In order to exert influence on national legal orders, the Court must have a caseload. 
In this book, we focus on the individual application, because it constitutes the 
primary means through which the regime generates the kinds of outcomes in 
which we are concerned. Individual rights claims make up, almost entirely,29 the 
Court’s docket. Each petition contains a detailed record of the domestic law and 
procedures that, allegedly, have failed to protect the applicant. Petitions thus pro-
vide a window into the internal workings of the national legal order. It is through 
this window that the Court will observe and review national law and practice in 
light of Convention requirements.
This system is a victim of its own success. Not only does the Court receive a 
steady stream of cases, the rising tide of applications now threatens to overwhelm 
the Court. A brief survey of annual rates of activity in this area is revealing.30 The 
European Commission of Human Rights received 49 individual applications in 
the decade of the 60’s, 163 in the 70’s, and 455 in the 80’s. With the enlargement 
and entry into force of Protocol no. 11, the numbers have exploded. In 1998, 
the Registry of the Court received 18,200 individual applications, a figure that 
has increased every year thereafter, to 50,500 in 2006. Although some 98% of all 
applications will be determined to be inadmissible for one reason or another, the 
Court is nonetheless overloaded.31 Today there are nearly 100,000 applications, 
in the post-admissibility phase, pending before the organs of the Court. The 
delay between application and a decision on the merits, has now reached more 
than five years (though only 5% of applications judged admissible will reach the 
merits stage). The annual rate of judgements on the merits rendered by the Court 
shows a similar pattern. Through 1982, the Court had rendered, in its history, 
only 61 such rulings pursuant to applications by individuals. It issued 72 such 
rulings in 1995; 695 in 2000; 1,105 in 2005; and 1,560 in 2006.
Sheer numbers tell only part of the story, and nothing about the nature of the 
claims and of the domestic contexts that generate the applications. Simplifying 
a complex set of issues, we can distinguish between quite different situations, or 
types of general problems, that the Court now regularly confronts. In a first situ-
ation, the Court seeks to enhance standards of rights protection, on the margins, 
in States that otherwise have a relatively good record of compliance with the 
Convention. The Court identifies gaps in rights protection and encourages States 
to adjust their law to fill those gaps. In this mode of operation, the Court may 
also develop new rights for discreet communities (e.g., of transsexuals) or for 
29 Through 2003, there were only twenty interstate applications, although some of these have 
resulted in important Court judgements.
30 The source for these data is the annual Survey of Activities published by the ECtHR on its web-
site: http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annual+surveys+ 
of+activity/ (most recently checked 31 January 2008).
31 The Court itself, in its Survey of Activities 2006, ibid., p. 3 states: “This enormous caseload has 
raised concerns over the continuing effectiveness of the Convention system.”
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specific situations (e.g., religious teaching in the schools). In post-Protocol no. 
11 Europe, the Court will never want for such opportunities. Where Convention 
standards for rights protection are higher than those in domestic legal orders, 
the Court can expect to be activated – systematically – by individuals seeking 
to change domestic law. And the more the Court undertakes to interpret the 
Convention in a progressive, expansive, and open-ended way, the more likely it is 
that rights protection in one or several States will routinely fall below Convention 
standards, creating pressure for national adaptation. In this situation, the Court 
arguably plays the role of a European Constitutional Court.
The Court faces a second, qualitatively different, type of problem when it 
encounters systemic failures to protect rights. Across Europe, many States find it 
virtually impossible to meet Convention standards, under Article 6(1) ECHR, 
for ensuring that judicial proceedings are initiated and completed in a reasonable 
time. In this area, floods of clone applications from certain countries, such as Ita-
ly, have become chronic.32 With enlargement into East and into the Balkans, the 
Court now confronts a third kind of problem: massive State failures to provide 
even minimal protection of the most basic rights, including the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment laid down by Article 3 ECHR. In 
some States, institutional capacities to protect rights are simply under-developed; 
in others, including Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine, political officials 
and judges fail to uphold even the most basic principles of rule of law. At present, 
the majority of judgements33 concern serious problems of either systemic or mas-
sive failure to protect Convention rights. In this situation, the Court arguably 
plays the role of a High Court of Appeal, or Court of Cassation.
Given these challenges, it is difficult to see how the Convention regime can 
prosper, if the Court sees its role primarily as providing individual justice. Indeed, 
as discussed, the Court has had little choice but to explore other options, such 
as the pilot judgements, in which it takes on the mantle of judicial lawmaker for 
States, in the context of a specific problem. To the extent that it does, of course, 
the Court positions itself to exercise relatively direct impact on domestic legal 
systems.
c. Jurisprudence
If, arguably, the ECHR has evolved certain constitutional features, the regime re-
mains a creature of international law. Most important, unlike national constitu-
tional or supreme courts, the Strasbourg Court does not possess the authority to 
invalidate national legal norms judged to be incompatible with the Convention. 
The absence of such authority constitutes a serious disadvantage to the extent 
32 See also in this volume Candela Soriano, Section C.2.b.
33 In 2006, 964 of the 1,560 rulings (63%) of the Court concerned just six states: Italy, Poland, 
Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, and the Ukraine. Data reported in European Court of Human Rights, 
Survey of Activities 2006 (supra note 30).
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that the regime is expected not only to render retrospective justice in individual 
cases, but also to construct Convention rights and to ensure their general ef-
fectiveness across Europe, prospectively. The Court can count on the Council 
of Europe’s support of a robust doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (under Article 46 
ECHR), and for the development of innovative approaches to systemic failures, 
such as pilot judgements. Such support, along with the good will and good faith 
of most States, should not be underestimated. The Court would fail at its mis-
sion without them. Nonetheless, the ECHR is an autonomous legal regime. The 
Court does not preside over a hierarchically constituted judicial system in which 
it exercises appellate review, or cassation powers, when it comes to decisions of 
national courts. Put differently, the Court’s command and control capacities are 
weak, at best. They are primarily reduced to the ordering of compensatory dam-
ages to be paid in just satisfaction to successful applicants.
In consequence, the Court performs its most important governance functions 
through the building of a precedent-based case law.34 Through precedent, the 
Court seeks to structure the argumentation of applicants and defendant States, 
to ground its rulings, and to persuade States to comply with findings of violation. 
The Court also relies heavily on precedent-based rationales to develop Conven-
tion rights, and to manage a complex environment, prospectively. The Court 
does so in the name of “legal certainty and the orderly development of [its] case 
law”.35 Convention rights, like the rights provisions of national constitutions, 
have been judicially constructed, and precedent both enables and constrains the 
Court’s creativity. The Court will abandon a line of case law in order to correct 
an earlier error, or “to ensure that the interpretation of the Convention reflects 
societal change and remains in line with present day conditions”.36
This mode of governance – through precedent – raises an empirical issue that 
is at the heart of our concerns. Convention rights will only have impact beyond 
any individual case to the extent that national officials take into account the 
Court’s jurisprudence in their own decision making. Incorporating the Conven-
tion directly into national legal orders, as directly enforceable law, may induce, or 
may legally require, national officials to do so. But incorporating the Convention 
in this way is not obligatory. National officials, including judges, will always 
possess some measure of discretion as to how to make use of the Court’s case 
law. They may decide to ignore the Court’s interpretation of the Convention, 
even when on point, and even where Convention rights have been domesticated 
through incorporation. Thus, the development of a coherent jurisprudence is 
a third necessary condition, but not sufficient in itself, for the ECHR to exert 
influence on national legal orders.
34 See Shelton (2003), 127.
35 Cossey v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 10843/84), Judgement (Plenary), 27 September 1990, 
Series A, Vol. 184, para. 35.
36 Ibid.
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In summary, the Court possesses all of the formal power required for it to ac-
quire dominance over the evolution of the Convention regime; today, its de facto 
dominance over the regime is fully secure. On the input side, we can expect that 
most important violations of Convention rights will be referred to Strasbourg, 
by one or more applicants. On the output side, the Court has produced a dense 
and elaborate case law that provides an authoritative construction of Convention 
rights and, thus, guidance to national officials who mean to apply the Conven-
tion on their own. If and how national officials actually do so is the major preoc 
cupation of this book.
B. Nature and Scope of the Project
1. Methodological Considerations
The goal of this volume is to assess, cross-nationally and across time, the impact 
of the Convention on national legal orders. Each chapter pairs two relatively like 
cases for comparative analysis, and the book as a whole should be read compara-
tively, across relatively unlike cases. Our coverage is wide, comprising countries 
in Western Europe (Ireland/the UK; France/Germany; Austria/Switzerland; Bel-
gium/the Netherlands); Central and Eastern Europe (Poland/Slovakia; Russia/
Ukraine); Southern Europe (Greece/Turkey, Spain/Italy); and Scandinavia (Swe-
den/Norway). For each report, authors responded to the same research questions, 
collecting and analysing the same types of data. In addition, external experts 
– including judges on the Strasbourg Court, national judges, and senior litiga-
tors and academics – were integrated into the project from the beginning.37 They 
attended our workshops, consulted with reporters in the course of their research, 
and commented on drafts of the reports.
For purely pragmatic reasons (space and resource limitations) this book does 
not cover all the Member States of the Council of Europe. Nonetheless, we chose 
a representative sample of States that vary on dimensions thought to be pertinent. 
States vary in terms of their length of time in the regime, region, difference in 
legal tradition, domestic experience with rights protection, and so on. We there-
fore selected a mix of older and newer members, of States belonging to different 
families of legal systems, and of systems that had and did not have strong national 
experience with rights protection. We also considered the importance of national 
systems as sources of applications to the Court. A considerable amount of case 
law stems from Central and Eastern Europe, so it was crucial to have State Parties 
of this region represented (Poland, Slovakia, Russia, and Ukraine); the same can 
be said of Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, and Turkey). At the same time, we 
also needed to include States that generate relatively few applications, not least, 
in order to evaluate the extent to which lower numbers of applications might be 
37 See the Acknowledgements, this volume.
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due to how these States have incorporated the ECHR into domestic law, and 
developed effective mechanisms of coordination. In any event, we chose to pair 
countries represented in this volume for reasons both theoretical and practical. 
The focus on States that are alike in certain ways helps us to control for certain 
common factors, while focusing more attention on contrasts that make a differ-
ence to the overall reception process. In fact, this type of design can eliminate 
some prima facie similarities between countries as important factors impinging 
on reception (see, for example, the chapter on Ireland and the United King-
dom38). While there is no denying that comparing two legal systems always poses 
methodological challenges, this volume shows that the advantages of comparison 
far outweigh the disadvantages, if we are to gain a better understanding of the 
impact of the ECHR on national legal systems. 
Comparative case studies are typically designed with specific purposes in 
mind. Since ours is no exception, it is important to be clear about what this 
project is, and is not, about. It bears emphasis up-front that this type of research 
is constrained in three important ways. First, well-specified, causal theory on the 
impact of the ECHR on its members does not exist. Thus, we could not design 
the project to test a specific set of hypotheses, or to adjudicate among contending 
theories. Second, extant empirical knowledge on the topic is sparse, and even 
the best research is rarely comparative.39 This project involves comparison at two 
levels: each of the nine chapters compares reception in two countries; and the 
book compares across eighteen State Parties to the ECHR. We chose a com-
parative approach to the national reports in order to maintain the advantages of 
in-depth, empirical case studies, while avoiding well-known problems associated 
with generalising the findings of a single case. The authors of the national reports 
themselves engage in comparison as a mode of explanation. Further, the reports 
raise important issues that would not have come to light in the absence of com-
parison. In the concluding chapter of the volume, we evaluate reception across 
all of our cases, in light of the data collected and the preliminary comparisons 
undertaken by the national reporters. Third, research of this kind can be fiercely 
difficult. Our approach is not limited to consulting published legal materials, but 
requires original research into matters outside the formal law. Indeed, each of the 
reports presents data that had never been collected before. 
We recognize that for many of our readers, the most important contribution of 
this book may well be the presentation of basic data on the status and effective-
ness of the ECHR in the various States under consideration. We nonetheless 
designed the research to move beyond basic description. We hope to offer useful 
insights on the dynamics of reception, and on the effectiveness of the ECHR, in-
sights that can only be obtained through relatively systematic data collection and 
comparative analysis. Each chapter provides a comparative analysis of similarities 
38 See in this volume Besson, Section IV.
39 Blackburn and Polakiewicz (2001) is an excellent exception.
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and differences found in two cases, and the concluding chapter of this volume is 
devoted to a broad summary of findings across all cases.
Although we did not set up our project to test a set of pre-existing hypotheses 
in any formal, scientific sense, we nonetheless defined our research problem in 
ways that would maximize prospects for building more general theory. Our em-
pirical focus is on the reception of the ECHR regime within national legal orders. 
By “national legal order”, we include the domains of the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary. It is through the decision-making of national officials that the 
Convention is given domestic agency. By national officials, we mean all agents 
of public authority – including judges, legislators, and administrators – who are 
authorised to take decisions that are capable of affecting the status of the ECHR 
within the national legal order. Reception may entail decisions that serve to en-
hance the effectiveness of the ECHR, as when officials adjust the law to comply 
with the judgements of the Strasbourg Court. Reception may also involve resist-
ance to the Convention, as when officials seek to limit its domestic reach and 
scope. To understand the extent to which the ECHR and national legal systems 
are coordinated over time, one must pay attention to both kinds of reaction.
This project therefore conceptualizes reception broadly, as a process that is 
not reducible to compliance with the ECHR in a strict legal sense. Our empiri-
cal focus is on how the Convention and the Court’s case law impact upon the 
decision making of domestic officials, primarily legislators, administrators, and 
judges. If and how national officials institutionalize specific mechanisms for the 
ongoing coordination of national law with the ECHR, as the latter evolves, is of 
particular interest. First, officials may develop preventive procedures for assessing 
future compliance problems, whether related to ratification or with day-to-day 
lawmaking after accession. Second, the Court’s judgements themselves may push 
officials to develop new practices that will impinge on reception: to comply with 
concrete rulings and to monitor future compliance; to translate and disseminate 
judgements; to implement pertinent recommendations of the Council of Eu-
rope; to amend laws and practices. Further, specific Court’s rulings may attract 
the interest of the media, and of scholars or other elites, which, in turn, may 
shape how officials react. Third, some mechanisms of reception operate at a more 
general level: on legal scholarship and education; on media coverage and public 
awareness, and on how police officers, judges, members of parliament, and other 
officials are trained. As discussed in the next section, our research project is de-
signed to assess reception on each of these three dimensions.
Stated in the language of the social sciences, our dependent variable (the 
phenomenon to be explained) is the effectiveness of the ECHR within national 
legal systems. Effectiveness varies both across legal systems, and diachronically 
within any single State. The ECHR can be said to be effective to the extent that 
national officials give agency or enforce Convention rights, within national legal 
orders, through their decisions. The Court’s evolving jurisprudence comprises the 
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main independent variable (the external catalyst of change in the national legal 
systems). Over time, the Court has progressively constructed Convention rights 
in ways that pressure national officials to adapt, or coordinate, the national legal 
systems with the ECHR. The various mechanisms of reception and coordination 
that the chapters describe constitute intermediate variables (determinates of how 
the independent variable acts upon the dependent variable), in that these proc-
esses condition if, how, and to what extent Convention rights influence national 
legal orders.
As a matter of comparative method, the book presents a series of structured-
focused comparisons,40 in which authors evaluate the parallel experiences of two 
countries with reference to data collected on the same research questions. The 
method of structured-focused comparison is commonly used to organize research 
on topics that are under-developed, both empirically and theoretically. We employ 
the method for classic purposes, namely, to develop (a) appropriate concepts, (b) 
a theoretical lexicon for analysing reception, and (c) empirical measures of ef-
fectiveness. Each is a preliminary stage in the derivation of candidate hypotheses 
to explain variance in the reception process. Single case studies are sometimes 
employed to perform some of these same tasks. Nonetheless, comparing two – 
relatively like – cases, as we do in each chapter, provides a stronger basis on which 
to build a more general comparative and theoretical framework.41 Moreover, as 
discussed in the concluding chapter, the scope of our research enables us to com-
pare across unlike cases, as we move from report to report.
We also proceeded in light of specific candidate propositions, which entailed 
collecting basic information on the various factors that we thought, a priori, 
might condition the reception process. Each of the chapters, for example, assesses 
the influence of national constitutional law, separation of powers doctrines, and 
the organization of the judiciary. The reports also evaluate various mechanisms 
for coordinating national legal orders with the ECHR, not all of which may oper-
ate effectively in any given national system. In their research, reporters searched 
for these and other mechanisms, and were asked to trace their origins and con-
sequences. Thus, the project began with some basic ex ante hypotheses on the 
table. We did not assume, however, that any of the hypotheses would be validated 
through empirical scrutiny. On the contrary, we had good reason to expect42 that 
the reception process would be the product of a complex mixture of the factors 
and social logics. The reports evaluate these propositions for each paired compari-
son, and we revisit our findings as a whole in the concluding chapter.
40 The classic statement of the method is George (1979). For an updated and extended discus-
sion, see George and Bennett (2005).
41 For a discussion of the aims of different research designs, see Eckstein (1975) and Lijphart 
(1971).
42 See Keller (2005). The model for the template that follows was derived from this paper by 
participants in the project.
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2. Empirical Questions
For each chapter, reporters respond to the same empirical questions. They present 
data collected on the same variables and indicators of effectiveness; they identify 
the processes and mechanisms of reception that have developed; and they assess 
the importance of these mechanisms over time, in two national cases. Taken to-
gether, the reports chart cross-national variance in the impact of the ECHR on 
national legal systems, and they provide materials for generating hypotheses that 
might explain this variance.43
a. Historical Context: Accession and Ratification
The chapters provide basic accession information for two States, reporting on 
the procedures through which they signed and ratified the Convention and the 
various protocols. Over time, States have acceded to the regime more smoothly, 
reflecting the growing political legitimacy of the Convention and its Court. In 
the 50’s, the leaders of most States assumed that ratifying the Convention would 
not require any meaningful adjustment on their part, in that they considered 
that the level of national rights protection was more than adequate. Yet they were 
more reticent to accept the right of individual application and the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, and they took, on average, longer to ratify the Treaty 
instruments. Of the original signatories, five (Belgium, France, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, and Turkey) took more than three years to move to ratification. France 
decided to ratify the ECHR only in the 1970s, more than 20 years after it signed 
the ECHR; and Greece ratified the Convention twice, in 1953 and for a second 
time in 1974 (the military regime had renounced membership in 1969). After 
the entry into force of the Convention, no State that signed the ECHR took 
more than three years to ratify it. By the 80’s, every new signatory was well aware 
that ECHR membership would require substantial adjustment, but the benefits 
of membership by then far outweighed the inconveniences. Today, membership 
in the ECHR confers a kind of certificate of approval on States.44 The reports 
also consider national debates on ratification, on lodging reservations, and on 
the degree to which these decisions reflected concern for how much change in 
domestic law would be required by membership in the regime. The more a State 
fully accepts its obligations under the Convention, of course, the more it will be 
exposed to the influence of the Convention.
43 Of course, one cannot both test hypotheses against the data used to construct the hypotheses. 
One could, however, test such hypotheses in research on cases of reception that fall outside of our 
study. See the concluding chapter for further discussion of this point, Section A.
44 Thus, in the 90’s, membership became obligatory for states who wished to join the European 
Union. 
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b. Status of the ECHR in National Law: Formal (Doctrinal) Elements
Certain factors – especially constitutional structure – will help to determine how 
the ECHR enters into and subsequently affects the national legal system. Of fun-
damental importance is the question of whether Convention rights possess viable 
supra-legislative status in the national legal order that judges may directly enforce. 
A first set of issues concerns national constitutions deal with the law of interna-
tional treaties. Every chapter explores the extent to which the national constitu-
tion contemplates monist, as opposed to dualist, solutions to conflicts between 
treaty law and national law, including statutes. A State that adopts a more monist 
posture to the ECHR – including the abandonment of the lex posteriori derogat 
legi priori principle – will be much more capable of building stable mechanisms 
for coordinating the ECHR with the national legal order than a State that main-
tains a strong dualist posture. A functionally equivalent situation can be created 
through the legislative incorporation of the ECHR into the national legal system, 
if the incorporation statute provides for the direct effect of Convention rights and 
their supra-legislative status. Thus, each report considers if, how, and with what 
effect on the national legal order the ECHR has been incorporated, and each as-
sesses the extent to which incorporation changes outcomes. As discussed in the 
concluding chapter,45 some States that are formally dualist (Belgium) or that have 
traditionally denied the direct applicability of treaty law in the domestic legal 
system (Austria) have nonetheless conferred on Convention rights constitutional 
or quasi-constitutional status, with truly transformative effects.
A second set of issues concerns separation of powers doctrines (or other explicit 
provisions of public law) that permit or prohibit the judicial review of legislative 
and executive acts with reference to higher norms. It could be supposed that the 
more experience national judges have with judicial review and rights adjudica-
tion, the easier it will be for the Convention to gain traction in the national legal 
order. Informed by research on the reception of the EU’s doctrines of supremacy, 
we also considered that the opposite might be true. In States without secure 
systems of rights and review, the ECHR might fill the void, substituting for 
constitutional rights, especially if monist doctrines or incorporation confers on 
Convention rights primacy over legislation. We find as much in monist Nether-
lands, and in dualist UK, after incorporation. In States that have well-established 
systems of constitutional justice, such as Germany and Ireland, litigators are far 
more likely to plead domestic constitutional law, rather than the Convention, 
before national judges. National judges, especially those sitting on constitutional 
courts, will have a weaker interest in developing Convention rights; they may 
even be jealous of their positions, and resist recognizing the primacy of Conven-
tion rights when they come into tension with constitutional rights.
A third set of issues concern how the State is organized. Among other fac-
tors, the reports examine the influence of federalism, the relationship between 
45 See Keller and Stone Sweet, this volume, Section A.3.b.
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parliaments and executives, and the organization of the judiciary. Of particular 
importance is the question of how many high (or supreme) courts exist. In some 
countries, one supreme court, of general jurisdiction, sits at the apex of a unified 
judiciary (e.g., Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway). In others, the legal system is 
itself divided into functionally differentiated sub-systems, each of which has its 
own high court (e.g., France, Germany). In the former case, the Supreme Court 
may be asked to clarify the law given divergent interpretations percolating up 
from below, or asked to ratify new interpretations of national law in light of the 
ECHR. In the latter case, different supreme courts may take varying doctrinal 
positions on the status of the ECHR, and these differences may or may not be 
subject to harmonisation.
With respect to rights protection, Europe today is characterized by a complex 
pluralism46 in which various sources of law and multiple courts interact to pro-
duce outcomes. In those countries in which constitutional courts hold a privi-
leged position, it is usually the interactions between constitutional judges and the 
ECHR that are crucial, although the positions of the European Court of Justice 
may also weigh heavily. In other countries, Belgium being a good example, the 
high ordinary courts may use the Convention in ways to assert their own author-
ity over rights, undermining the presumptive monopoly of the constitutional 
judge. In virtually every country, the Convention has enhanced judicial author-
ity vis-à-vis the legislative and executive branches. Most of the reports therefore 
explore these complex judicial politics in some detail, as we do in the concluding 
chapter.
c. Overview of the Activity of the Court
For each State covered, authors present basic information on the formal interac-
tions between the Strasbourg Court and the national legal order, including data 
on the following activity: the annual number of applications filed against each 
State; the annual number of judgements on the merits since national accession; 
the Article(s) of the ECHR concerned for each application and judgement; and 
the decision of the Court on these applications (violation or non-violation of 
Convention rights). A State that generates relatively more applications and more 
findings of violation is a State placed under relatively more pressure to adapt to 
the ECHR. National officials may resist adaptation, of course. After all, it may be 
that relatively higher levels of censure by the ECHR are artefacts of past failures 
to adapt on the part of national officials.
The data, which are comprehensive through 2006, provide a dynamic, multi-
dimensional view of the Court’s direct interactions with national legal orders. 
They also show wide cross-national variation, and raise questions in and of them-
selves. Why do some countries generate more application than others? Why does 
the same country generate more applications in some domains than others? The 
46 Krisch (2008).
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data reveal these and other puzzles, many of which we are not in the position to 
resolve. Nonetheless, in their analyses, reporters depict and seek to explain vari-
ation across their cases, and we discuss these matters further in the concluding 
chapter. 
d. The European Court’s Case Law
In this Section, authors focus on the impact of the Strasbourg Court’s rulings 
on applications originating from the legal systems on which they report. The 
extent of the Court’s influence can be assessed most directly following a finding 
of violation on the part of the Court. Such rulings challenge national officials to 
take decisions that will render national law compatible with the Convention. The 
chapters identify the most important ECHR findings of violation for each State 
covered, and then trace how national officials in fact responded to these rulings. 
The Court’s rulings on admissibility, on national law finding no violation, on 
applications originating in other members, might also influence the decision-
making of national officials, to the extent that the Court has given guidance as to 
how the right must be interpreted and applied in national legal orders. The ques-
tion then would be whether national officials take these clarifications on board in 
making their own decisions. 
e. Mechanisms of Coordination
One of the most important and difficult tasks facing the authors of the reports 
was the analysis of the various mechanisms of coordination that have emerged in 
national legal orders over time. Reception takes place through those procedures 
that enable national officials to adapt national law to the evolving dictates of 
ECHR law. These procedures may be legislative, administrative, or judicial; they 
may be ad hoc or fully entrenched; and they may be more or less successful at 
rendering Convention rights more effective. The chapters trace the development 
of these mechanisms and evaluate how they operate, in light of the project’s over-
arching concern for the effectiveness of the ECHR in national legal orders.
As discussed, one basis on which stable mechanisms of coordination may 
emerge and institutionalize is through conferring on the ECHR both direct ef-
fect and primacy in any conflict with statute and infra-legislative norms. Some 
States have done so through adopting a strong monist posture; others have in-
corporated the Convention through special statutes that are recognized as having 
supra-legislative status. In doing so, States open the door to the development of 
practices (mechanisms) designed to promote the effectiveness of the ECHR in 
the national legal orders. Judges may assert a new, or more robust, authority to 
review the Conventionality of legislative and administrative acts; and executives 
and legislators may evolve new procedures for scrutinizing, ex ante and in-house, 
the compatibility of new law with Convention rights.
Many States have, in fact, evolved such mechanisms, altering, sometimes pro-
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foundly, how parliamentary governance operates in Europe. In States where the 
dogmas of legislative sovereignty had previously gone unchallenged, the devel-
opment of stable, effective mechanisms of coordination will, inevitably, subvert 
traditional separation of powers arrangements and expectations.47 In countries 
that possess a catalogue of national constitutional rights and a supreme or consti-
tutional court, it has generally been left to the constitutional judge to determine 
the status of Convention rights. In most countries, supreme and constitutional 
courts have found ways, over time, to enhance the effectiveness of Convention 
rights in the national legal order while maintaining the centrality of their own 
positions, even in the face of dualism. We will discuss these points at length in 
the concluding chapter, with reference to the book’s findings.
Mechanisms of coordination are typically embedded in larger governmental 
processes that take account of important public interests and priorities beyond 
protecting Convention rights. A national judge who is placed under a duty to in-
terpret a statute in light of Convention rights may still be bound by that statute, 
which is itself a product of legislative authority. A national judge who controls 
the proportionality of a national statute reviews how the legislature has already 
balanced the ECHR and the public good. The legislative committee charged with 
evaluating the Conventionality of a parliamentary bill submitted by the Govern-
ment is made up of Members of Parliament who have agendas beyond protecting 
rights. We could go on. The broader point is that mechanisms do not organize 
coordination in any mechanical or linear way. National officials have choices to 
make, and these are conditioned by a complex structure of incentives, many of 
which do not flow from the national legal orders relationship to the ECHR.
Generally, national officials will not work to enhance the effectiveness of the 
ECHR in national legal orders if they do not see it in their interest to do so. 
One of the more ambitious goals of this volume is to chart, over time, changes 
in the interests of national officials. In some States, hostility and resistance to 
the Court have been replaced by a cooperative attitude (e.g., France). In other 
States (e.g., the Scandinavian countries), we find judges and politicians starting 
to take notice of the regime that they all but ignored over many decades. In some 
situations, it may be that the incentives in place are basically negative: in the face 
of a rising number of negative rulings by the Court, national officials develop 
mechanisms of coordination to help them insulate the national legal order from 
censure in Strasbourg. In other situations, judges and politicians may invoke 
and give agency to Convention rights for their own purposes. Judges may wish 
to expand their capacity to control elected politicians; a governing party may 
wish to enshrine rights that will constrain other parties when the latter come to 
power; officials may be responding to an increasing societal demand for enhanced 
47 As discussed in the concluding chapter of this volume, the reception of the European Court 
of Justice’s doctrines of supremacy and direct effect have had effects in the same direction, see Keller 
and Stone Sweet, this volume, Section A.3.b.
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rights protection. In any case, reception provokes dynamics of change and some 
of these changes will alter the strategic setting of national officials which will, in 
turn, alter the choices they make. 
f. Remedies and Proportionality
The effectiveness of national remedies for violations of Convention rights is it-
self a direct indicator of the effectiveness of the ECHR in national legal orders. 
The reports examine the evolution of national systems of remedies, as they have 
evolved with reference to the ECHR. The Convention does not stipulate reme-
dial requirements beyond the terms of Article 13 ECHR, which requires States to 
provide victims of a violation of their rights with an effective remedy before a na-
tional authority. Nonetheless, in its case law on Article 13 ECHR, now dense and 
sophisticated, the Court has steadily raised standards. Today, Article 13 covers 
virtually every aspect of how national legal systems are organized and function. 
Applicants routinely invoke Article 13, leading the Court to review how national 
systems of justice operate at a deep structural level. When the Court finds vio-
lations of Article 13, it exerts heavy pressure on the State to reform its institu-
tions and established practices, or risk ongoing exposure to ECHR censure. As 
the reports vividly show, the Court goes far beyond the rendering of individual 
justice in this area. Indeed, many of its decisions concern how the national legal 
order must be reformed structurally, and such reforms are often constitutionally 
significant.
The impact of Article 13 on national legal orders has also been registered on 
judicial doctrines and, in particular, on standards of judicial review. As discussed 
above, the Court adopted proportionality balancing as a standard approach for 
managing conflicts between Convention rights and the government’s interest in 
pursuing collective goods that may qualify those rights. Proportionality analysis, 
however, was not native to most States. In a series of cases involving the UK, 
the ECHR gradually adopted the view that Article 13 required judges to engage 
in proportionality review of government acts that infringe upon certain core 
Convention rights, Articles 8–11 and 14, in particular. In doing so, the ECHR 
destroyed the viability of the traditional reasonableness tests long employed by 
UK judges and others. As the Court noted in Peck v. United Kingdom,48 under 
that test, individuals would have to show that UK authorities had acted “ir-
rationally in the sense that they had taken leave of their senses or had acted in a 
manner in which no reasonable authority could have acted”49 in order to have 
their claims reviewed. The ECHR’s position, in contrast, is that, once a prima 
facie case for a violation of Convention rights has been established, judges must 
move to necessity analysis, which involves applying a least-restrictive means test. 
48 Peck v. United Kingdom (appl. no. 44647/98), Judgement (Fourth Section), 28 January 2003, 
Reports 2003-I, 123.
49 Ibid., para. 105, quoting the High Court ruling rejecting Peck’s appeal.
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Stated in American parlance, the adaptation requires a shift from a rational basis 
to a strict scrutiny standard, although proportionality analysis also leaves room 
for deference to the States under the margin of appreciation doctrine.50
Under the Court’s supervision, proportionality – today a transnational, consti-
tutional principle in Europe – is in the process of diffusing to every national legal 
order in Europe. The reports examine this process and assess its impact on rights 
protection at the national level.
g. Knowledge and Practice
To this point we have focused on relatively direct and formal measures of impact, 
such as the institutionalisation of judicial and legislative mechanisms of recep-
tion, and the reform of national law after a finding of violation by the Court. To 
measure the more sociological influence of the Convention, at the level of cogni-
tion, practice, and social reproduction, for example, it is necessary to go beyond 
a focus on formal procedures and law. The chapters report if, how, and the extent 
to which three types of practices – lawyering, teaching, and scholarship – have 
changed as a result of the reception of the ECHR in national legal orders. Each of 
these practices may track and measure impact.51 Changes in these practices may 
also reinforce reception, or accelerate it. The more lawyers, teachers and students, 
and doctrinal authorities consider and reference the ECHR, the more they may 
help to institutionalize mechanisms of coordination, for example. Indeed, it may 
even be useful to consider their activities, under certain conditions, to be supple-
mentary mechanisms of coordination. Changes in knowledge and practice may 
alter the mix of costs and benefits that national officials consider when deciding 
how to make reception-relevant decisions. Each chapter thus reports on how the 
ECtHR’s ruling are disseminated domestically, and on the extent to which layer-
ing, teaching, and scholarship have changed over time.
C. A Europe of Rights
The ECHR has evolved into a sophisticated legal system whose Court can be ex-
pected to exercise substantial influence on the national legal systems of its mem-
bers. In the 21st Century, Europe is a Europe of rights. The Convention system 
constitutes an authoritative, dynamic, and transnational source of law. At the 
same time, most High Contracting Parties have incorporated the ECHR, thereby 
domesticating it in important ways. We therefore proceeded on the view that 
the Convention’s legal system, post-Protocol No. 11, ought to be conceptualized 
50 For a general overview of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the ECHR, see Arai-Taka-
hasi (2002). The inconsistencies in how the ECHR deploys the doctrine of margin of appreciation 
have come under a great deal of criticism, see Letsas (2006) and Bruach (2005).
51 This list is not exhaustive, indeed, there are many other indirect measures that can and should 
be the focus of research.
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broadly (rather than in more narrow, formalistic terms) to include the reception 
of the ECHR, by national officials, at the domestic level. As the reports that fol-
low this introduction show, one cannot understand how the Convention system 
actually functions without paying close attention to how that system interacts 
with, and impacts upon, national law. In the concluding chapter of this volume, 
we will return to these themes in light of this volume’s most important findings.
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